[Bmi] computational terms as a sign of maturity

Sun Feb 17 18:07:00 EST 2013

Dear John,

I think your point (a science, or discipline, is immature until its phenomena can be explained in computational terms) is debatable. In 'On understanding understanding' (International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 11:1 [1997], 7-20), Roger Penrose argues, by use of specific examples, that 'mathematical understanding is something which cannot be modelled in terms of entirely computational procedures'. See also his book The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Physical World, BCA, 2004, pp. 7-24, 374-378,1027-1045; and his foreword to Hector Zenil (ed.), A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature as Computation, World Scientific, 2013. 

Talking about scientific/computational modelling, I would like to raise the following questions:

1) Can the mind be modelled directly or only indirectly (via the brain)? If the latter, why?   

2) Can the the mind (as distinct from the brain) be modelled wholly or only partly? If the latter, why?

3) In the ongoing mind-body debate, to which camp do you belong?  

4) Do you think we are (very complicated) robots? If so, what makes these robots acting and behaving?

5) If we are robots, physically determined, where does our sense of liberty, justice or compassion come from?

6) In the sentence 'the mind models the mind' subject equals object, right? How can?

7) If mind and culture are somehow related (I think they are pretty much the same), what could be the relationship between nature (brain) and culture? And would it be (theoretically) possible to formalise this relationship?

It seems to me that an unequivocal answer to thrse vexed questions is a prerequisite for having a sensible discussion about mind's embodiedness (link with brain) and embeddedness (link with society/Mitwelt).   

Kind regards, 
Hans Kuijper 
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Juyang Weng 
  To: Professor Ron Sun 
  Sent: Saturday, February 16, 2013 11:29 PM
  Subject: computational terms as a sign of maturity

  Ron, 

  Congratulations on your planned book. I noticed the following claim on the page Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences: In particular, this book will not be limited to computational approaches.

  It is true that we as scientists should be open to all kinds of account about nature: computational, qualitative, intuitive, experimental, pure data from observations. Yes, when a more scientific theory was not available, we humans resort to religious, traditional, and cultural explanations. 

  However, is it true that any disciplines in natural science is immature till its phenomena, observations, data can be sufficiently explained in computational terms?

  I guess that any studies on social, cognitive science, and whatever science are immature till many phenomena in the discipline can be explained in computations.

  What is computation? Computation is the real-time account about how elements in the world interact constrained by principles that are best explained in mathematical terms. Here are a few examples from a "low-level" discipline to "higher" disciplines:

  Mathematics: Explanations of quantities and structures in space and time are immature till they can be explained in terms of computation.  For example, how a value z is computed from two variables x and y by a function f,  in z=f(x, y).  Addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, are all computational functions. When the precise computations have not been been discovered or available, we have to resort to less specific properties, such as an existence proof. However, an existence proof must still use properties of computation, e.g., algebra. 

  Physics: Explanations of the rich and complex interactions of physical objects (e.g., when your hand let go of an apple) were immature till we humans discovered the computational terms. Newton's Principia that formulated the laws of motion and universal gravitation is an example.   

  Chemistry:  Explanations of atoms, molecules and their interactions, and various forms of a mixture of matters are immature till humans can explain such phenomena through computational terms, such as the periodic tables of chemical elements, energy, and force. Chemistry is also governed by mathematics. 

  Biology:  Explanations of biological species (e.g., plants, and animals) are immature till humans can explain such phenomena through computational terms. Genome and how genes regulate development is an example. Biology is also governed by chemistry and mathematics. 

  Brain science: Explanations of brain data (e.g., orientation maps, ocular dominance maps, and topographic maps in the V1 area) are immature till humans can explain such phenomena through computational terms.  For example, how such maps arise in computational terms, regulated by nature (e.g., genes) and nurture (e.g., external environment and brain activities).  Brain science is also governed by biology, chemistry and mathematics. 

  Psychology (cognitive Science as part of it): Explanations of cognitive phenomena (e.g., vision, audition, behaviors (including actions), motivation, etc.) are immature till humans can explain such phenomena through computational terms.   For that, we need computational terms of the brain, since those psychological phenomena are external phenomena of the brain. Existing phenomena accounted by models in psychology and the computational models in artificial intelligence are all useful, although the gaps between such studies and those accounted by the brain science are very wide.  Such wide gaps must be bridged. Psychology is also governed by brain science, biology, chemistry and mathematics. 

  Social sciences:  Explanations of multi-human phenomena (e.g., traditions, religions, culture, labor relations, laws, political science, international conflicts, wars, etc.) are immature till humans can explain such phenomena through computational terms. Social sciences are also governed by psychology, brain science, biology, chemistry and mathematics. Our social scientists and politicians must learn psychology, brain science, biology, chemistry and mathematics. As far as I can see, filling this wide gap has started to take place.

  A current major infrastructural limitation in every country, which is also true in a developed country like US, is that our academic disciplines are too specialized for anybody to understand the natural bridges that fill the wide gap. Therefore, we are partially "blind" by such an infrastructural limitation. That is why we started the Brain-Mind Institute, to overcome such a major limitation.  

  Just my 2 cents of worth.

  -John

  On 2/14/13 6:29 PM, Professor Ron Sun wrote:

    Hans: 

    I think this is exactly what you are looking for:

      a.. R. Sun (ed.), Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 2012. 

    On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:38 PM, "hans kuijper" <j_kuijper at online.nl> wrote:

      Dear BMILISTS,

      Over the last three months or so, I have been following some of your work with great interest, trying to understand it in the context of fast developing cognitive science(s?). I do believe that the mind is embodied and consequently biologists, particularly brain scientists, (will) have a lot to say about this ill-defined 'thing'. 

      However, educated in the humanities (I graduated in sinology from Leyden University) and becoming increasingly interested in the science of complexity, I believe that the mind is also embedded. For, as Lev Vygotsky already argued in his book Mind in Society (1930): 'The mind cannot be understood in isolation from the surrounding society', an original idea revisited in Andrzej Nowak, Katarzyna Winkowska-Nowak and David Brée (eds.), Complex Human Dynamics: From Mind to Society, Springer, 2013.

      Culture (that other notoriously difficult to describe 'thing', about which many books have been written) seems to be the missing link between mind and society. So the conundrum workers in the natural and cultural (i.e. social and human) sciences should address collaboratively is the identification, characterisation and understanding of the intimate connection between mind's embodiedness and embeddedness. 

      Arguably, there is nothing more complex than a country, or a culture, being a hypercomplex system of complex systems in context (its outside world). If 'a revolution is occurring in the social sciences', as the editors of Complex Human Dynamics claim, that easily overlooked point is to be taken into account. See the article 'Lifting the study of China onto a higher plane' that I recently posted on the website www.academia.edu.     

      Since I am currently working on a book provisionally entitled The Complexity of Countries, I wonder if anyone of you could suggest what I should definitely read to be well-informed about the cutting edge research not only on brain, mind, society and culture but also (and perhaps in the first place) on the relationships between these intricately patterned entities. 

      Needless to say, I would be most grateful if you could help me.

      Yours sincerely, 

      Hans Kuijper
      Joliotplaats 5
      3069 JJ Rotterdam
      The Netherlands
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