[Bmi] computational terms as a sign of maturity

Juyang Weng weng at cse.msu.edu
Sun Feb 17 19:59:55 EST 2013


Dear Hans,

Thank you very much for your points.

I have a basic disagreement with Roger Penrose.   I am now giving him a 
CC so that he can join our discussion.  Prof. Penrose, please let me 
know if you like to be dropped from this discussion.

I suggest that Prof. Roger Penrose should learn neuroscience first and 
then re-examine his positions.

In particular, the Godel's incompleteness theory that he cited has a 
fundamental problem.  Kurt Godel proved his incompleteness theory in 
1931. I guess that his idea was inspired from a paradox that Bertrand 
Russell <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell> discovered in 
1901, now called Russell's paradox:
\text{let } R = \{ x \mid x \not \in x \} \text{, then } R \in R \iff R 
\not \in R
Put in an intuitive way, Russell defined a set so that a particular 
logic question cannot be answered as simply yes or no. Kurt Godel did a 
similarly thing.

Think about a simpler version of the paradox:  I define the set of my 
sisters based on the condition that the person is NOT my sister.  Then, 
"is the person my sister?" cannot be answered.

There are many ways to object to Roger Penrose's position.  My first 
objection could be: "In the Brain's self-organization principles: there 
is no absolutely right or wrong" as I argued in
The 2nd Open Letter to the US President Obama: Why US Should Be Friendly 
with Every Government? 
<http://www.brain-mind-magazine.org/read.php?file=BMM-V1-N2-paper5-Obama.pdf#view> 

In other words, there is no absolute yes or no answer for a brain. For 
any natural-world question, two brains can come up with two different 
answers: one answers yes and the other no.   Therefore, mathematical 
logic seems too simple and too rigid as a tool for studying brain-mind.

Your questions are great ones.  I am afraid that not all my answers 
below are correct or agreeably by many experts on this email list.  Just 
for the purpose of discussion, I try to give my response.   Let me know 
if I am wrong.  You all are welcome to BMI this summer so that we can 
further our interesting discussion.

1) Can the mind be modelled directly or only indirectly (via the brain)? 
If the latter, why?

Weng: Yes.  Any model of the nature is an approximation, including more 
basic phenomena described by Newtonian physics.  I gave a simplified 
model about the rise of a mind from a grounded emerging brain inNatural 
and Artificial Intelligence
<http://www.brain-mind-institute.org/press.html>
2) Can the the mind (as distinct from the brain) be modelled wholly or 
only partly? If the latter, why?

Weng: Only partially, since we humans can never say that we have a 
complete understanding about the nature. Newtonian physics is an 
example.   An interesting point is then whether we can model to a large 
degree so that the difference from the nature is not very obvious to us.
3) In the ongoing mind-body debate, to which camp do you belong?

Weng: I think that mind is impossible without the corresponding body.  
This does not mean that a robot body has to be developed (a designed 
body seems to be more practical for robots at the current stage of 
technology). I also belong to an optimistic camp, since the basic 
principles to give rise to probably the first-order mind seem to be 
relatively simple.   Do not laugh at me at this point.  Come to the BMI 
to convince yourself.
4) Do you think we are (very complicated) robots? If so, what makes 
these robots acting and behaving?

Weng: Yes, we are "meat robots" in a sense.  Five factors made us: (1) 
environment, (2) sensors, (3) effectors, (4) developmental mechanisms 
such as those of a cell
(I called it developmental program), and (5) how we are taught. Although 
those cellular mechanisms in (4) are relatively simple, many cells work 
together to give rise to amazing minds.
5) If we are robots, physically determined, where does our sense of 
liberty, justice or compassion come from?

Weng: Largely from the above 5 factors, but experience played a critical 
role.   We thought that we have independent minds.  But in fact, we do 
not really.   Each individual mind is heavily shaped by the environment, 
including mother, father, brothers and sisters, and peers.   When one 
says "I want ...", what he wants is largely determined by the 
environment from which he is raised and the current environmental context.
6) In the sentence 'the mind models the mind' subject equals object, 
right? How can?

Weng: Great question!  That is why understanding one's own mind using 
one's own mind seems to be one of the last scientific problems facing 
humanity.   Fortunately, humans have spent so much money and resource in 
studying the nature including human nature.  Now, we seem to be very 
close to solving this mystery "in the first order sense" but in precise 
computational terms. Yes, brain-mind phenomena can also be simulated and 
demonstrated by developmental robots (not traditional non-developmental 
robots).  But this demonstration needs resource and time.   We need to 
"raise" our robots like the way we "raise" our children in our human 
environments.
7) If mind and culture are somehow related (I think they are pretty much 
the same), what could be the relationship between nature (brain) and 
culture? And would it be (theoretically) possible to formalise this 
relationship?

Weng: a mind is what its corresponding brain does.   Culture seems to be 
the common knwoledge and common behaviors among many brains in a 
society.  The physical brains enable the rise of culture after many 
generations of brains interact with the environment in this world 
(including other brains and bodies).   Like culture, traditions, 
languages, politics, sense of right or wrong, all emerge from such 
interactions.   Yes, it seems possible to rigorously formalise this 
relationship theoretically in mathematical terminology.  We all can work 
together along this line.   I hope that Prof. Roger Penrose can be 
convinced one day.

Just my 2 cents of worth.

-John


On 2/17/13 6:07 PM, hans kuijper wrote:
> Dear John,
> I think your point (a science, or discipline, is immature until its 
> phenomena can be explained in computational terms) is debatable. In 
> 'On understanding understanding' (/International Studies in the 
> Philosophy of Science/, 11:1 [1997], 7-20), Roger Penrose argues, by 
> use of specific examples, that 'mathematical understanding is 
> something which cannot be modelled in terms of entirely computational 
> procedures'. See also his book /The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide 
> to the Physical World/, BCA, 2004, pp. 7-24, 374-378,1027-1045; and 
> his foreword to Hector Zenil (ed.), /A Computable Universe: 
> Understanding and Exploring Nature as Computation/, World Scientific, 
> 2013.
> Talking about scientific/computational modelling, I would like to 
> raise the following questions:
> 1) Can the mind be modelled directly or only indirectly (via the 
> brain)? If the latter, why?
> 2) Can the the mind (as distinct from the brain) be modelled wholly or 
> only partly? If the latter, why?
> 3) In the ongoing mind-body debate, to which camp do you belong?
> 4) Do you think we are (very complicated) robots? If so, what makes 
> these robots acting and behaving?
> 5) If we are robots, physically determined, where does our sense of 
> liberty, justice or compassion come from?
> 6) In the sentence 'the mind models the mind' subject equals object, 
> right? How can?
> 7) If mind and culture are somehow related (I think they are pretty 
> much the same), what could be the relationship between nature (brain) 
> and culture? And would it be (theoretically) possible to formalise 
> this relationship?
> It seems to me that an unequivocal answer to thrse vexed questions is 
> a prerequisite for having a sensible discussion about mind's 
> embodiedness (link with brain) and embeddedness (link with 
> society//Mitwelt/).
> Kind regards,
> Hans Kuijper
>
>     ----- Original Message -----
>     *From:* Juyang Weng <mailto:weng at cse.msu.edu>
>     *To:* Professor Ron Sun <mailto:dr.ron.sun at gmail.com>
>     *Sent:* Saturday, February 16, 2013 11:29 PM
>     *Subject:* computational terms as a sign of maturity
>
>     Ron,
>     Congratulations on your planned book. I noticed the following
>     claim on the page Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences
>     <http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/%7Ersun/book-mitp.html>: In particular,
>     this book will not be limited to computational approaches.
>
>     It is true that we as scientists should be open to all kinds of
>     account about nature: computational, qualitative, intuitive,
>     experimental, pure data from observations. Yes, when a more
>     scientific theory was not available, we humans resort to
>     religious, traditional, and cultural explanations.
>
>     However, is it true that any disciplines in natural science is
>     immature till its phenomena, observations, data can be
>     sufficiently explained in computational terms?
>
>     I guess that any studies on social, cognitive science, and
>     whatever science are immature till many phenomena in the
>     discipline can be explained in computations.
>
>     What is computation? Computation is the real-time account about
>     how elements in the world interact constrained by principles that
>     are best explained in mathematical terms. Here are a few examples
>     from a "low-level" discipline to "higher" disciplines:
>
>     *Mathematics*: Explanations of quantities and structures in space
>     and time are immature till they can be explained in terms of
>     computation.  For example, how a value z is computed from two
>     variables x and y by a function f,  in z=f(x, y). Addition,
>     subtraction, multiplication and division, are all computational
>     functions. When the precise computations have not been been
>     discovered or available, we have to resort to less specific
>     properties, such as an existence proof. However, an existence
>     proof must still use properties of computation, e.g., algebra.
>
>     *Physics*: Explanations of the rich and complex interactions of
>     physical objects (e.g., when your hand let go of an apple) were
>     immature till we humans discovered the computational terms.
>     Newton's /Principia/ that formulated the laws of motion
>     <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_laws_of_motion> and
>     universal gravitation
>     <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_law_of_universal_gravitation>
>     is an example.
>
>     *Chemistry*:  Explanations of atoms, molecules and their
>     interactions, and various forms of a mixture of matters are
>     immature till humans can explain such phenomena through
>     computational terms, such as the periodic tables
>     <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Periodic_table> of chemical
>     elements, energy, and force. Chemistry is also governed by
>     mathematics.
>
>     *Biology*:  Explanations of biological species (e.g., plants, and
>     animals) are immature till humans can explain such phenomena
>     through computational terms. Genome and how genes regulate
>     development is an example. Biology is also governed by chemistry
>     and mathematics.
>
>     *Brain science*: Explanations of brain data (e.g., orientation
>     maps, ocular dominance maps, and topographic maps in the V1 area)
>     are immature till humans can explain such phenomena through
>     computational terms.  For example, how such maps arise in
>     computational terms, regulated by nature (e.g., genes) and nurture
>     (e.g., external environment and brain activities).  Brain science
>     is also governed by biology, chemistry and mathematics.
>
>     *Psychology (cognitive Science as part of it):* Explanations of
>     cognitive phenomena (e.g., vision, audition, behaviors (including
>     actions), motivation, etc.) are immature till humans can explain
>     such phenomena through computational terms.   For that, we need
>     computational terms of the brain, since those psychological
>     phenomena are external phenomena of the brain. Existing phenomena
>     accounted by models in psychology and the computational models in
>     artificial intelligence are all useful, although the gaps between
>     such studies and those accounted by the brain science are very
>     wide.  Such wide gaps must be bridged. Psychology is also governed
>     by brain science, biology, chemistry and mathematics.
>
>     *Social sciences: *Explanations of multi-human phenomena (e.g.,
>     traditions, religions, culture, labor relations, laws, political
>     science, international conflicts, wars, etc.) are immature till
>     humans can explain such phenomena through computational
>     terms. Social sciences are also governed by psychology, brain
>     science, biology, chemistry and mathematics. Our social scientists
>     and politicians must learn psychology, brain science, biology,
>     chemistry and mathematics. As far as I can see, filling this wide
>     gap has started to take place.
>
>     A current major infrastructural limitation in every country, which
>     is also true in a developed country like US, is that our academic
>     disciplines are too specialized for anybody to understand the
>     natural bridges that fill the wide gap. Therefore, we are
>     partially "blind" by such an infrastructural limitation. That is
>     why we started the Brain-Mind Institute, to overcome such a major
>     limitation.
>
>     Just my 2 cents of worth.
>
>     -John
>
>     On 2/14/13 6:29 PM, Professor Ron Sun wrote:
>>     Hans:
>>
>>     I think this is exactly what you are looking for:
>>
>>       * R. Sun (ed.), Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences
>>         <http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/%7Ersun/book-mitp.html>. MIT
>>         Press, Cambridge, MA. 2012.
>>
>>
>>     On Feb 14, 2013, at 5:38 PM, "hans kuijper" <j_kuijper at online.nl
>>     <mailto:j_kuijper at online.nl>> wrote:
>>
>>>     Dear BMILISTS,
>>>     Over the last three months or so, I have been following some
>>>     of your work with great interest, trying to understand it in the
>>>     context of fast developing cognitive science(s?). I do believe
>>>     that*the mind is embodied*and consequently biologists,
>>>     particularly brain scientists, (will) have a lot to say about
>>>     this ill-defined 'thing'.
>>>     However, educated in the humanities (I graduated in sinology
>>>     from Leyden University) and becoming increasingly interested in
>>>     the science of complexity, I believe that *the mind is
>>>     also embedded*. For, as Lev Vygotsky already argued in his book
>>>     /Mind in Society/(1930): 'The mind cannot be understood in
>>>     isolation from the surrounding society', an original idea
>>>     revisited in Andrzej Nowak, Katarzyna Winkowska-Nowak and David
>>>     Brée (eds.),/Complex Human Dynamics: From Mind to Society/,
>>>     Springer, 2013.
>>>     Culture (that other notoriously difficult to describe 'thing',
>>>     about which many books have been written) seems to be the
>>>     missing link between mind and society. So the conundrum workers
>>>     in the natural and cultural (/i.e./social and human) sciences
>>>     should address collaboratively is the identification,
>>>     characterisation and understanding of*the intimate connection
>>>     between**mind's embodiedness and embeddedness*.**
>>>     **
>>>     Arguably, there is nothing more complex than a country, or a
>>>     culture, being a hypercomplex system of complex systems in
>>>     context (its outside world). If 'a revolution is occurring in
>>>     the social sciences', as the editors of/Complex Human
>>>     Dynamics/claim, that easily overlooked point is to be taken into
>>>     account. See the article 'Lifting the study of China onto a
>>>     higher plane' that I recently posted on the
>>>     websitewww.academia.edu <http://www.academia.edu>.*//*
>>>     Since I am currently working on a book provisionally
>>>     entitled/The Complexity of Countries/, I wonder if anyone of you
>>>     could suggest what I should definitely read to be well-informed
>>>     about the cutting edge research not
>>>     only on_brain_,_mind_,_society_and_culture_ but also (and
>>>     perhaps in the first place) on the relationships between these
>>>     intricately patterned entities.
>>>     Needless to say, I would be most grateful if you could help me.
>>>     Yours sincerely,
>>>     Hans Kuijper
>>>     Joliotplaats 5
>>>     3069 JJ Rotterdam
>>>     The Netherlands
>

-- 
--
Juyang (John) Weng, Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
MSU Cognitive Science Program and MSU Neuroscience Program
3115 Engineering Building
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824 USA
Tel: 517-353-4388
Fax: 517-432-1061
Email: weng at cse.msu.edu
URL: http://www.cse.msu.edu/~weng/
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