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Dear Hans,<br>
<br>
Sorry, I made an error in my "five factors" when I was typing my
last email. What I meant was:<br>
<font face="Arial">(1) sensors, (2) effectors, (3) developmental
mechanisms such as those of a cell<br>
(I called it developmental program), (4) computational resources,
and (5) how the individual is taught.</font><br>
<br>
> <font face="Arial">Is what the brain does an event or an
action?<br>
<br>
I am afraid that neither is true all the time, since (1) it is not
independent from the environment at the current time and (2) it
does not have to have an explicit action (but it is almost always
associated with actions per our simplified computational brain-mind
model).<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
<br>
-John</font><br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/18/13 10:48 AM, hans kuijper
wrote:<br>
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<div><font face="Arial">Dear John,</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Thanks for your prompt and elaborate
response. Let's wait and see whether/how (some of) the
recipients of our emails respond. I hope Sir Roger
Penrose will read your suggestion with a smile. </font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Your definition of mind ('A mind is what
its corresponding brain does') intrigues me. <strong>Is what
the brain does an event or an action? </strong>On the
difference between the two, see:</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Samuel Guttenplan,<em> Mind's Landscape</em>,
Blackwell, 2000;</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Bruno Gnassounou, <em>Philosophie de
l'action</em>, Vrin, 2007;</font> </div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis
(eds.), <em>A Companion to the Philosophy of Action</em>,<em>
</em>Blackwell, 2010;</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial"><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action">http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action</a>;
</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial"><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://sites.google.com/site/pacherie/home">https://sites.google.com/site/pacherie/home</a><font
size="2">.</font></font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Hans</font></div>
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<div style="FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </div>
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial; BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; font-color:
black"><b>From:</b> <a moz-do-not-send="true"
title="weng@cse.msu.edu" href="mailto:weng@cse.msu.edu">Juyang
Weng</a> </div>
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial"><b>To:</b> <a
moz-do-not-send="true" title="j_kuijper@online.nl"
href="mailto:j_kuijper@online.nl">hans kuijper</a> </div>
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial"><b>Sent:</b> Monday, February 18,
2013 1:59 AM</div>
<div style="FONT: 10pt arial"><b>Subject:</b> Re: computational
terms as a sign of maturity</div>
<div><br>
</div>
Dear Hans,<br>
<br>
Thank you very much for your points. <br>
<br>
I have a basic disagreement with <font face="Arial">Roger
Penrose. I am now giving him a CC so that he can join our
discussion. Prof. Penrose, please let me know if you like to
be dropped from this discussion. <br>
<br>
I suggest that Prof. </font><font face="Arial"><font
face="Arial">Roger Penrose</font> should learn neuroscience
first and then re-examine his positions.<br>
<br>
In particular, the Godel's incompleteness theory that he cited
has a fundamental problem. Kurt Godel proved his </font><font
face="Arial"><font face="Arial">incompleteness theory in 1931.
I guess that his idea was inspired from a paradox that </font></font><font
face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><a moz-do-not-send="true"
title="Bertrand Russell"
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell">Bertrand
Russell</a> discovered in 1901, now called Russell's
paradox:</font></font><br>
<font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><img class="tex"
alt="\text{let } R = \{ x \mid x \not \in x \}
\text{,
then } R \in R \iff R \not \in R"
src="cid:part6.01020904.08010600@cse.msu.edu"><br>
Put in an intuitive way, Russell defined a set so that a
particular logic question cannot be answered as simply yes
or no. </font></font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font
face="Arial">Kurt Godel did a similarly thing.<br>
<br>
Think about a simpler version of the paradox: I define
the set of my sisters based on the condition that the
person is NOT my sister. Then, "is the person my sister?"
cannot be answered. <br>
<br>
There are many ways to object to </font></font></font><font
face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font
face="Arial">Roger Penrose's position. My first
objection could be: "In the Brain's self-organization
principles: there is no absolutely right or wrong" as I
argued in <br>
</font></font></font></font><font face="Arial"><font
face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.brain-mind-magazine.org/read.php?file=BMM-V1-N2-paper5-Obama.pdf#view">The
2nd Open Letter to the US President Obama: Why US
Should Be Friendly with Every Government?</a> <br>
In other words, there is no absolute yes or no answer
for a brain. For any natural-world question, two brains
can come up with two different answers: one answers yes
and the other no. Therefore, mathematical logic seems
too simple and too rigid as a tool for studying
brain-mind. <br>
<br>
Your questions are great ones. I am afraid that not all
my answers below are correct or agreeably by many
experts on this email list. Just for the purpose of
discussion, I try to give my response. Let me know if
I am wrong. You all are welcome to BMI this summer so
that we can further our interesting discussion. <br>
</font></font></font></font><br>
<font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font
face="Arial"><font face="Arial">1) Can the mind be
modelled directly or only indirectly (via the brain)?
If the latter, why? <br>
</font> <br>
Weng: Yes. Any model of the nature is an approximation,
including more basic phenomena described by Newtonian
physics. I gave a simplified model about the rise of a
mind from a grounded emerging brain in<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.brain-mind-institute.org/press.html">
Natural and Artificial Intelligence<br>
</a></font></font></font></font><br>
<div><font face="Arial">2) Can the mind (as distinct from the
brain) be modelled wholly or only partly? If the latter,
why?<br>
<br>
Weng: Only partially, since we humans can never say that we
have a complete understanding about the nature. </font><font
face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font
face="Arial">Newtonian physics is an example. An
interesting point is then whether we can model to a
large degree so that the difference from the nature is
not very obvious to us. <br>
</font></font></font></font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">3) In the ongoing mind-body debate, to
which camp do you belong?<br>
<br>
Weng: I think that mind is impossible without the
corresponding body. This does not mean that a robot body
has to be developed (a designed body seems to be more
practical for robots at the current stage of technology). I
also belong to an optimistic camp, since the basic
principles to give rise to probably the first-order mind
seem to be relatively simple. Do not laugh at me at this
point. Come to the BMI to convince yourself. <br>
</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">4) Do you think we are (very
complicated) robots? If so, what makes these robots acting
and behaving?<br>
<br>
Weng: Yes, we are "meat robots" in a sense. Five factors
made us: (1) environment, (2) sensors, (3) effectors, (4)
developmental mechanisms such as those of a cell<br>
(I called it developmental program), and (5) how we are
taught. Although those cellular mechanisms in (4) are
relatively simple, many cells work together to give rise to
amazing minds. <br>
</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">5) If we are robots, physically
determined, where does our sense of liberty, justice or
compassion come from?<br>
<br>
Weng: Largely from the above 5 factors, but experience
played a critical role. We thought that we have
independent minds. But in fact, we do not really. Each
individual mind is heavily shaped by the environment,
including mother, father, brothers and sisters, and peers.
When one says "I want ...", what he wants is largely
determined by the environment from which he is raised and
the current environmental context. <br>
</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">6) In the sentence 'the mind models the
mind' subject equals object, right? How can?<br>
<br>
Weng: Great question! That is why understanding one's own
mind using one's own mind seems to be one of the last
scientific problems facing humanity. Fortunately, humans
have spent so much money and resource in studying the nature
including human nature. Now, we seem to be very close to
solving this mystery "in the first order sense" but in
precise computational terms. Yes, brain-mind phenomena can
also be simulated and demonstrated by developmental robots
(not traditional non-developmental robots). But this
demonstration needs resource and time. We need to "raise"
our robots like the way we "raise" our children in our human
environments. <br>
</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">7) If mind and culture are
somehow related (I think they are pretty much the same),
what could be the relationship between nature (brain) and
culture? And would it be (theoretically) possible to
formalise this relationship?</font></div>
<font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font
face="Arial"><br>
Weng: a mind is what its corresponding brain does.
Culture seems to be the common knwoledge and common
behaviors among many brains in a society. The physical
brains enable the rise of culture after many generations
of brains interact with the environment in this world
(including other brains and bodies). Like culture,
traditions, languages, politics, sense of right or
wrong, all emerge from such interactions. Yes, it
seems possible to rigorously formalise this relationship
theoretically in mathematical terminology. We all can
work together along this line. I hope that Prof. Roger
Penrose can be convinced one day. <br>
<br>
Just my 2 cents of worth.<br>
<br>
-John<br>
</font> </font><br>
</font><br>
</font>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/17/13 6:07 PM, hans kuijper
wrote:<br>
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<div><font face="Arial">Dear John,</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">I think your point (a science, or
discipline, is immature until its phenomena can be
explained in computational terms) is debatable. In 'On
understanding understanding' (<em>International Studies in
the Philosophy of Science</em>, 11:1 [1997], 7-20),
Roger Penrose argues, by use of specific examples, that
'mathematical understanding is something which cannot be
modelled in terms of entirely computational
procedures'. See also his book <em>The Road to Reality: A
Complete Guide to the Physical World</em>, BCA, 2004,
pp. 7-24, 374-378,1027-1045; and his foreword to Hector
Zenil (ed.), <em>A Computable Universe: Understanding and
Exploring Nature as Computation</em>, World Scientific,
2013. </font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Talking about
scientific/computational modelling, I would like to raise
the following questions:</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">1) Can the mind be modelled directly
or only indirectly (via the brain)? If the latter, why? </font>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">2) Can the mind (as distinct from
the brain) be modelled wholly or only partly? If the
latter, why?</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">3) In the ongoing mind-body debate,
to which camp do you belong? </font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">4) Do you think we are (very
complicated) robots? If so, what makes these
robots acting and behaving?</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">5) If we are robots, physically
determined, where does our sense of liberty, justice or
compassion come from?</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">6) In the sentence 'the mind models
the mind' subject equals object, right? How can?</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">7) If mind and culture are
somehow related (I think they are pretty much the same),
what could be the relationship between nature (brain)
and culture? And would it be (theoretically) possible to
formalise this relationship?</font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">It seems to me that an
unequivocal answer to these vexed questions is a
prerequisite for having a sensible discussion about
mind's embodiedness (link with brain) and embeddedness
(link with society/<em>Mitwelt</em>). </font></div>
<div> </div>
<div><font face="Arial">Kind regards, </font></div>
<div><font face="Arial">Hans Kuijper </font></div>
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<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
--
Juyang (John) Weng, Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
MSU Cognitive Science Program and MSU Neuroscience Program
3115 Engineering Building
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824 USA
Tel: 517-353-4388
Fax: 517-432-1061
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:weng@cse.msu.edu">weng@cse.msu.edu</a>
URL: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.cse.msu.edu/~weng/">http://www.cse.msu.edu/~weng/</a>
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